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Reciprocity as deliberative capacity: Lessons from a citizens 
deliberation on carbon pricing mechanisms in Australia 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Australia has seen a deep division in opinion in search of a carbon pricing mechanism. 
While concepts of carbon taxation and emission trading have comparable public 
support, climate scepticism is influencing the debates in political and public spheres 
in downplaying the need for carbon pricing. Public deliberation forum is a possible 
engagement option to address the conflict inherent in climate policy preferences. This 
research explores the way that a deliberative forum promoted effective 
communication between participants through which conflict between policy 
preferences became more tractable. The forum involved 24 Australians. While it did 
not eliminate disagreement in preferences in the choice of carbon pricing mechanisms, 
participants reached consensus on fundamental principles such as the need for trusted 
sources of information, trusted governance procedures and accountability by 
appropriate institutions. Shared political expectations encouraged dialogue and 
cooperation in discussions by enhancing reciprocal understanding. Two sceptical 
participants who originally had strong disagreements with the rest of the group found 
common ground. Public deliberative forums that are conducive to reciprocal 
communication are able to provide a mechanism for joint problem-solving processes 
that are less adversarial and more responsive to the variety of people’s preferences.   
 
Keywords: public deliberation; consensus; emission trading; carbon tax; deliberative 
democracy; Australia. 
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Introduction 
Public opinion on whether global climate change is human-induced and if so the most 
appropriate policy responses is divergent and changing as the issue evolves. A 
significant portion of citizens currently dispute climate change estimates, including 
biophysical effects and sea level rise predictions (Alexander et al in press; Climate 
Institute 2010; Hulme 2009). Public debate has escalated and in many instances has 
polarised in response to mass media involvement and political partisanship, biasing 
representations of the impacts of emission trading schemes (ETSs) and casting doubt 
on economic implications (Pietsch and McAllister, 2010; Spash, 2010). The opinions 
of climate change sceptics have been found to impact the course of public debate on 
climate mitigation strategies (Climate Institute 2010; Leviston and Walker 2010; 
Nerlich 2010; Oreskes and Conway 2010). The divisive debate poses challenges to 
effective governance of climate mitigation and adaptation (Few et al., 2007; 
Amundsen et al. 2010; Krause 2011; Pitt 2010; Osberghaus et al. 2010; Hobson and 
Niemeyer, 2011). 
Constitutional institutions that encourage adversarial politics have a tendency to 
reduce opportunities for parties and individuals to cooperate in search of acceptable 
policies. Public engagement through dialogue with citizens and stakeholders, such as 
citizen forums, has been seen as an alternative that can enable collaborative efforts 
supporting environmental decision making, future planning, and/or elicit behavioural 
change (Alexander, 2010; Marks 2006; Stangellini 2010). Deliberative forums can 
create an effective dialogue between climate change actors (McGrum et al., 2009; 
Hobson and Niemeyer 2011). Public deliberation promotes social learning through 
reflection upon preference, and assists in reconciling conflict while building 
cooperative capacity towards consensual outcomes. The concept has risen in 
prominence in society generally, increasing deliberative democracy by encouraging 
citizens to be involved in detailing their opinions, finding mutually justifiable reasons 
and recognising the values held by others when engaging in policy discussions 
(Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Dryzek, 2000; Smith 2003).  
National deliberative forums, such as the Senate and House of Representatives, 
have been envisaged as the proper site where climate change policy decisions gain 
democratic legitimacy. This view is espoused by, for example, the Australian Leader 
of the Opposition and the Greens political party, neither of whom were convinced of 
the potential benefits of a citizens’ assembly for climate change and mitigation 
responses proposed by the Prime Minister of Australia (SBS News, 2010). 
Deliberative democrat John Dryzek (2000) argues that formal institutions alone 
cannot constitute an effective deliberative system, as they are dependent on electoral 
responses in competitive electoral systems which do not contribute to deliberative 
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capacity, rather tend to stifle opinions. He defines deliberative capacity as the extent 
to which a political system possesses structures to host deliberations that are authentic, 
inclusive, and consequential (Dryzek, 2010a). Authenticity refers to the capacity of 
deliberation to “induce reflection noncoercively, connect claims to more general 
principles, and exhibit reciprocity” (Dryzek, 2010a, p. 1382). This requires formal 
policy-making processes to strengthen connections to informal or non-traditional 
institutions and practices which perform a liberative function of displacing symbolic 
politics and promote reflection upon preferences and their transformation (Chamber, 
2009; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Niemeyer, 2004). 
The greater capacity to reflect and modify their minds as a result of their 
participation in deliberation is one dimension where ordinary citizens may make 
better deliberators than partisan political actors (Dryzek, 2010b, p.158; see also 
Hendriks et al., 2007, p. 369-371).  Authentic deliberation guided by the principle of 
reciprocity affirms the deliberative ideal that “citizens must provide reasons in terms 
that those with whom they disagree can accept” (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2006, p. 643; 
see also Gutmann and Thompson, 1996). Specific convictions and concerns should be 
articulated in ways that connect to alternative claims through their links to more 
general, shared principles of political life. Affirmative observations demonstrating an 
improving deliberative capacity can shed light on what designed deliberative forums 
ought to achieve in an informally constituted and empowered space for the production 
of collective decisions. 
However, what these links are and how they get shape in political deliberations 
remain unclear. A handful of empirical studies have provided details on the 
development of mutual understanding and impetus to evolve consensual decisions 
through deliberation. An important micro-political process is the creation of cultural 
connections. Davies and Burgess (2004), for instance, highlighted the intention of 
deliberating citizens to understand their experiences and identities in relation to 
networks of expertise. Soma and Vatn (2010) noted the tendency of participants to 
withdraw from personal and partial considerations. Others emphasised the 
construction of thoroughly considered preference. Goodin and Niemeyer (2003) 
affirmed the role of information-induced internal reflection, particularly in 
emancipating the deliberating individuals from symbolic distortions (Niemeyer, 2004, 
2011). Group deliberation might also help mitigate epistemic and linguistic 
uncertainties among stakeholders (Liu et al, 2010). Multiple micro-political processes 
contribute to the development of consensual basis of public policy decision. 
What remain contested are the relative importance of the different ways in which 
reflective experiences are induced. Among these empirical studies there are nuanced 
variations in conceptualising observations of mutual understanding among 
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deliberating citizens. These variations can be related to the two ideal deliberative 
activities: discursive communication influenced by perceptions of trust and cultural 
norms, and epistemic enlightenment through clarification of facts and rational 
emancipation. Cooperative discourse has been advocated as an integration of analytic 
elements with discursive processes (Lennox et al., 2011; National Research Council, 
2008; Renn, 2006; Stirling, 2006). As Dryzek (2010) observes, however, the time for 
truly comprehensive integrated statements of the essence of deliberative democracy 
may have gone. The empirical turn in which deliberative democratic theory is subject 
to systematic empirical testing has exposed tension between the analytic and 
discursive requirements (Lo, 2011a). Reciprocity is one core element of the theory 
that has been associated with varied connotations. Further empirical evidence on this 
key aspect could shed light on the evaluative criteria and the role of deliberative 
public engagement. 
 
In this paper, we ascertain the basis of conflict and consensus observed from the 
deliberative process in an attempt to inform the theoretical debate. The concept of 
deliberative capacity is illustrated by showing the way that reciprocal understanding 
was enhanced among individuals participating in the deliberative decision-making 
process and contributed to an increased level of cooperation within the deliberative 
forum group. The inquiry is based on findings from an Australian deliberative forum 
about carbon pricing policy. The next section outlines the debate on the proposed ETS 
and public views about emission mitigation strategies reported by research studies. 
The workshop design is then introduced. Following that the workshop process is 
described, after which the transcripts collected during the workshop are analyzed, 
following a brief report on survey responses. Consequent conceptual implications 
drawn from the workshop proceedings are presented in the discussion and the 
conclusions follow. 
 
 
 
 
Background 
In Australia, an ETS was officially proposed in late 2008 to provide economic 
incentives for emission mitigation, known as the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme 
(CPRS) (Department of Climate Change 2008). An ETS involved setting an emission 
cap and selling permits to emit carbon dioxide at freely fluctuating market prices. 
Under the CPRS, the government intended to provide free permits to selected 
trade-exposed, energy-intensive industries and return the $A11.5 billion earned from 
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selling emission permits as compensation to minimise impacts on the economy by 
offsetting price rises (Department of Climate Change 2008). Free price variation of 
permit was envisaged to be restricted by an initial government-administered price cap 
set at A$10 per permit, subsequently rising to $40 over time (Department of Climate 
Change 2008, Ch. 8, p. 37).  
Some critics considered the amount of compensation and subsidies available to 
major polluters to be excessively generous (Curran 2009; Spash 2010). The price cap 
provision was seen as a compromise to potential economic efficiency by Jotzo and 
Betz (2009). The Greens political party opposed the lenient targets set out in the 
CPRS, while the opposition Liberal party was concerned with potential job losses and 
the impact on economic viability. Consequently, the CPRS failed to secure adequate 
parliamentary support in December 2009.  
In view of the divisive public opinions, the Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, 
attempted to extend the national debate over alternative measures. In July 2010, she 
called for a high-profile ‘citizens’ assembly’ as part of her election promise to gain 
community consensus on a price on carbon through designed deliberative activities 
among citizens. The ‘citizens’ assembly’ concept was abandoned less than three 
months later, in favour of a multi-party climate change committee consisting of 
Members of Parliament (The Australian 2010). 
During this period, various alternatives, remedies and complements to the ETS 
were proposed. A widely discussed alternative was the introduction of a carbon tax, 
thereby charging for each unit of emission directly produced. This was supported by 
Humphreys (2007) and Spash (2010) for its (i) lower administrative costs, (ii) lower 
potential for industrial manipulation, and (iii) greater certainty for businesses. In 
addition, voluntary carbon markets have been considered by the Australian 
government to complement establishment of an ETS. The National Carbon Offset 
Standard was introduced in July 2010 to promote standardisation (Department of 
Climate Change 2009). Jotzo and Betz (2009) favoured an improved ETS that would 
have consistent access to international permit trading opportunities. 
Increasingly, the general public have been found to be concerned about the 
possible economic impacts of radical actions proposed for climate mitigation and 
adaptation. According to the annual opinion polls by Hanson (2010), in 2006, 68% of 
Australians agreed that global warming was a serious and pressing problem and 
immediate actions were needed, regardless of the significance of the costs. These 
figures contracted to 60% of respondents in 2008, 48% in 2009 and 46% in 2010 
(Hanson 2010, p. 14). The poll results indicate that 7% of respondents did not accept 
actions that might put the economy at risk and would only support actions after 
general public and political consensus was reached about the negative impacts of 
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global warming. Approximately 8% (2008) and 13% of respondents (both 2009 and 
2010) shared this view (Hanson 2010). The Climate Institute’s (2010, p. 11) survey 
noted a growth in tendencies to deny climate change effects, denialism. Although the 
majority of Australians (77%) were convinced that climate change was due to human 
activities, more people disagreed about this claim in 2010 (23%) than in 2009 (16%).  
Public preferences for the ETS have been found to be divided. Pietsch and 
McAllister (2010) found in their survey of 1000 participants that the ETS was 
positively received by the majority (58%) of the Australians. While 29% strongly 
favoured the scheme, 22% also strongly opposed the ETS. Of those who described 
themselves as very well informed about climate change, a third strongly supported the 
ETS and a third strongly opposed the introduction of an ETS. Strong opinions 
outnumbered milder opinions suggesting a strongly opinionated minority within the 
population were opposed the ETS. There was a tendency for polarisation of attitudes, 
which Pietsch and McAllister (2010) claim has been accelerated by the successful 
knowledge diffusion from climate change sceptics and industrial lobby groups into 
the public arena. They also noted that the strong opponents may include those who 
accept the evidence of human-induced climate change but doubt that the proposed 
ETS is the right policy instrument to address climate change issues.  
Respondents of a national survey by Carson et al. (2010) were almost evenly 
split on whether an ETS should apply initial exemption to the transport sector. 
Nevertheless, they expressed a great concern about giving special treatment to 
energy-intensive sectors, even when told that this could minimise job disruptions. In 
their survey, Carson et al. (2010) included a trinary choice of achieving emission 
reductions using tradable permits, taxes, or tighter technology standards. Results 
indicated an overwhelming preference for technology standards (57.7%), over permits 
(25.1%) or taxes (17.2%) (Carson et al. 2010, p. 908). Support for taxes, nonetheless, 
rose to 22.5% and permits down to 23.7%, when the respondents were more informed 
about the different mechanisms. 
Seemingly, under persistent divisions within political and public spheres, 
consensual outcomes are difficult to attain without providing dialogue, discussion and 
deliberation to nurture mutual understanding between actors. Against this political and 
policy backdrop, the authors conducted a deliberative forum to understand more about 
the impact of dialogue and influence on peoples’ decision-making and choice of 
formal schemes to encourage greenhouse gas emissions reductions and form policies 
dedicated to mitigating factors implicated in global climate change. It was conducted 
a week after the Prime Minister’s announcement of the prospective citizens’ assembly, 
at which time, the participants expressed great interest in the controversial media 
debate. 
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The Case Study  
The ‘Australian Climate Policy Forum’ deliberative workshop was held on 31 July 
2010 in Canberra. Twenty four citizens participated who were recruited randomly 
from the Canberra region via responses to a mailout questionnaire. Participant 
selection was based on perspectives about emission trading, expressed in a 
preliminary survey administered through email, to ensure representation of key 
positions, i.e. ETS, carbon tax and climate scepticism. The selection process resulted 
in a narrow, unrepresentative demographic sample. As such, the findings from the 
workshop provide insights into the dynamics within the workshop setting, without 
being representative of the population as a whole. More males (15) were in attendance 
than females (9). Most were middle-aged and educated, working professionals. The 
homogeneity may be a consequence of the relatively narrow demographic profile of 
the region and failure to reach a larger population of potential participants. Twenty 
participants lived in the Australian Capital Territory, mainly Canberra, and four in 
New South Wales, mostly from the city of Goulburn.  
During the workshop, participants were involved in a series of group discussions 
on carbon pricing and clean energy financing issues after scientific presentations of 
information relating to the topics under discussion. The objectives of the workshop 
were to evaluate current government efforts towards climate change, consider the 
future of the Australian emissions mitigation policy and assess potential economic 
implications. Four specialists were involved as invited presenters to share information 
and knowledge related to dedicated themes, including:  
1. the science of climate change; 
2. the economic and policy implications of climate change; 
3. the international climate politics and  
4. the economics of emission trading and carbon tax.  
The presenters were allocated 30 minutes, and the final presentation, which focused 
on the mechanisms of various policy approaches and the strengths and weaknesses of 
the ETS and carbon tax, was allotted 45 minutes to respond to queries by workshop 
participants and provide more detailed information suited to the participant 
deliberation that followed the presentations.   
Group discussions occurred throughout the presentations. The first session 
focused on ‘Concern about climate change’, where the participants defined the 
problem at hand and expressed views about general issues, such as Australia’s 
responsibility in greenhouse gas reduction and the relative importance of emission 
mitigation. The theme of the second session was ‘Carbon pricing’, which occurred 
after the emission trading presentation. The discussion explored the merits of the four 
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possible carbon pricing arrangements; emission trading, carbon tax, voluntary carbon 
offsetting (where participants can voluntarily provide monetary contributions to 
schemes that reduce carbon emissions) and taking no action (where no carbon pricing 
on human activities is required). In the third session, participants considered a range 
of financial issues under the theme of ‘Financing low-emission energy technologies’. 
This session involved a focused discussion on willingness to financially contribute to 
research and development of low-emission energy technologies. Participants formed 
three groups to discuss each topic, with each group facilitated by a CSIRO researcher. 
Participants completed a questionnaire at the beginning and at the end of the 
workshop. Survey tasks included ordinal ranking of the abovementioned four carbon 
pricing options (from most preferred to least preferred) and expressing willingness to 
pay (WTP) for emission mitigation. Group discussions were recorded, transcribed and 
analysed in reference to the deliberative dynamic, providing a delineation of the ways 
in which viewpoints converged during the workshop.  
 
Stated Primary Preference 
Survey data confirmed a clear stated preference for official carbon pricing, both 
before and after the information and deliberation process (Table 1). A carbon tax was 
found to be most favoured, receiving 12 primary votes, 3 votes ahead of an emission 
trading proposal. Only three individuals preferred no official pricing of carbon or 
unofficial pricing through voluntary offset markets. An initial group preference 
emerged following the deliberative activities. Carbon tax received the majority of 
support post deliberation and was chosen by more people as the principal option, 
yielding a net increase from 12 to 16 votes. 
Initially, two subjects (Nancy and Mike)1 held opposing views by categorically 
rejecting the ideas of emission trading and carbon taxation. They saw no need for 
pricing carbon and declined the WTP request. The deliberation improved cooperation 
of sceptical individuals. Mike contributed to the increasing group support for the 
carbon tax option, and Nancy became more sympathetic to emission trading. Both 
returned a positive WTP, indicating a qualitative convergence in their WTP decisions.  
 
Observed Deliberative Dynamic 
This section reports the verbal interaction amongst participants during formal 
discussions. Based on a qualitative analysis of transcripts, this section outlines how 
participants constructed their climate change discourses by reasoning, projecting 
boundaries to sharpen positions and articulating requirements of their preferred 
                                                 
1 All participant names reported are arbitrarily assigned to preserve participant anonymity 
9 
 
climate change policy. Key conflicts encountered and shared concerns are highlighted 
in the following sections.  
 
Encountering conflict 
In some groups, discussions began with palpable tension apparent. The information 
presented on the technical and policy dimensions of climate change, was sufficient   
to allow people to form and/or reform opinions weakly held in response to uncertainty 
surrounding the topic. The discussions that followed indicated participants were 
aware of, and concerned about, the influence of climate scepticism in Australia. One 
of them, James, started his conversation with a cynical tone: ‘No climate sceptics 
here?’, and Ross responded ‘Well there are some, there are people who are sceptical 
about it. They don't believe that it's happening at all’. Those who were not professed 
sceptics but interacted with sceptical individuals in the general community tended to 
be cynical or even hostile towards sceptical and opposing viewpoints. For instance, 
when describing a local campaign promoting energy efficiency, Dave claimed they 
were ‘fighting climate change deniers’ and Kevin echoed this sentiment immediately 
by referring to his own experience.  
Mike had identified himself as a “denier” in a pre-workshop correspondence: 
‘This has become a polarised argument amongst two distinct camps; those who 
believe that recordable global warming is not a result of human activity and those 
who believe that the emission of industrial carbon gases is directly the cause of 
irregular weather patterns……My views are more directly associated with the first 
camp.’ 
The two ‘camps’ appeared to be limited by their opinions predicated upon 
competing beliefs. For example, the individuals committed to emission mitigation 
constructed their arguments mainly around moral virtues, indicated by phrases such as 
‘Science seems to be saying we ought to’, ‘greatest moral challenge’, and ‘we have a 
responsibility’. They envisaged Australia as a role model for other nations to follow in 
emission mitigation. Moral outrage at ecological changes were expressed referring to 
the possibility that in the future the Great Barrier Reef may severely suffer from 
temperature rises ,consequently having an economic impact on eco-tourism.  
Sceptical individuals seemed to offer two main arguments. The first argument 
was the problem of incomplete evidence to substantiate anthropogenic climate change 
claims. Perceived uncertainties and limits of current knowledge have led to suspicion 
of the scientific propositions concerning the significance of the problem. For example, 
rather than denying the harmful effects of industrial emissions, doubts were expressed 
that the current level has reached a tipping point: ‘So we have less of carbon dioxide, 
amongst other gases, absorption, so as you industrialise and farm more land there's 
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less ground absorption. So everything you say Kevin is right, but it's grouped up now 
to what extent, what percentage?’(Mike). The second argument was that Australia had 
made a minimal contribution to global climate change: ‘we are not the biggest 
polluters on Earth anyway, are we?’ (Nancy).  
Discernable conflict began to surface as people felt more comfortable and 
became more expressive during the workshop proceedings. When Kevin who 
favoured an ETS tried to exclude the options of voluntary offsetting and carbon 
pricing from further consideration, Mike indicated his reluctance by saying ‘Yes, I 
give the no carbon pricing at this stage in time’ and seconded by Nancy ‘I’m going 
with the last one too’. Kate was also leaning toward this option, on the proviso that 
global initiatives were firstly to be put in place. A division unfolded as concerns about 
carbon pricing were further discussed and various opinions surfaced. Explicit 
disagreements between the two ‘camps’, notably between Mike and Kevin, indicated 
a heightened level of conflict. Putting a price on carbon was deemed to be 
unnecessary by Mike who favoured direct regulations. The rebuttal from Kevin was 
that ‘There’s no way we’re going to get a reduction of carbon without a cost’. At this 
point Mike no longer challenged the evidence of harmful greenhouse effect, but 
stressed the ineffectiveness of the proposed policy measures. His reply to Kevin’s 
view concerning cost adjustment encountered strong reaction: 
 
Mike:  That’s just because you assume that there must be a punishment for the 
emission. Now, what we didn’t discuss in there is that at this relative 
stage in the industry, particularly power generation that we’re talking 
about, there’s only a technological advance we can make. We’ve 
virtually hit the valley. At this stage in time in general 90 per cent of the 
power that’s generated in Australia cannot be improved upon or made 
more efficient. 
Kate:  Yes it can. 
Kevin:  I totally disagree with that. Totally disagree. 
Mike:  With umpteen billion... 
Kevin:  Not umpteen - well there’s a number of ways you could do it. You can 
do it with renewable sort of energy. Well you may discount that but 
there are a lot of people that don’t discount that. 
 
Milder disagreement was again observed in Session 2 among individuals 
committed to emission mitigation, particularly when controversies about emission 
trading entered into the debate. For example, Alan and Elaine argued with each other 
over the feasibility and effectiveness of an emission cap, frequently introducing their 
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arguments with ‘but….’ to counter other’s responses, indicating a clear difference in 
perspectives.  
Varying levels of support for an ETS were observed in all groups, not only at the 
beginning of Session 2 but also near the closure. This suggested disagreement 
persisted. Yet a closer investigation indicated some emergence of common grounds. 
For example, when Alan and Howard exchanged views as to the commonality of the 
ETS and carbon tax, Kevin also pointed out a shared feature, that is, ‘the government 
is going to compensate you like welfare to make up for the increased costs’.  
 
Characterising problems: Markets and trust 
Common grounds unfolded as the debate moved from expressions of personal 
preferences and stances to characterisation of policy limitations. Questions were 
raised and disappointments expressed as to the limited efforts towards emission 
mitigation made by major actors, namely, businesses, governments, and the public. 
Expressed doubts and disappointments contained important shared subjective 
elements and contributed to temporary alliances and shared agreement between 
previously differing individuals. This occurred as participants reflected on the 
overwhelming concerns and limitations of ETS if relying on regulation by market 
systems.  
The possibility of cheating and market manipulation was deemed to be the 
biggest issue surrounding ETS. For example, ‘I’d be wary of the ETS of market 
manipulation. We see how proficient traders are at developing new systems like what 
brought down, went on the global financial crisis, with the manipulations of the 
market’ (Ian). Brian concurred: ‘to me all these market-based things, they leave open 
the option of rorting and that’s what’s happened in our society’. One of the sceptical 
individuals, Mike, remained unconvinced: ‘Well that methodology [of ETS] has got a 
pretty big downer for me because it’s not controlled sufficiently by Government from 
what I can see. It falls out into the hands of the private markets and we lose control of 
our own sovereign rights’. This was one remarkable occasion where an opponent of 
carbon pricing joined his non-sceptical counterparts. 
 Participants unanimously criticised government and political involvement. Some 
held a cynical attitude toward the government for its unsatisfactory record of official 
response: ‘they can’t even do pink batts and you’re wanting them to look after an 
emissions trading scheme? I mean, they couldn’t even look after a carbon tax, let’s be 
exact’ said Philip. When prompted to evaluate the government’s contributions to 
addressing climate change, Ian responded ‘It hasn't done anything’ and Brian 
concurred and said ‘You're joking’.  
The discontent was extended to politicians in general. Failure to properly 
12 
 
respond to climate change issues and develop mitigation plans was attributed to 
‘playing politics’. Some contended that politicians turned a deaf ear to the evidence of 
climate change, although a few disagreed with this statement. The participants were 
united in articulating a complaint that politics rather than the state of global 
environment was taken as the main game. Common grounds became more audible as 
cynical comments were shared within the group; distrust in government has also been 
shown to occur in other areas of natural resource management.  
 
Articulating shared principles 
Perspectives converged at the level of broad principles. Having discerned shared 
concerns, individuals were able to jointly articulate criteria for a preferred carbon 
pricing policy. The criteria included factors of effect certainty and accountability. All 
groups demanded clear emission reduction targets, dedicated use of the raised funds, 
accountability for allocation systems, and guaranteed reduction in emissions. 
Advocates of ETSs generally were not in favour of carbon taxation because ‘It doesn’t 
give a guarantee of the emissions reduction’ (Elaine), whereas ETS is ‘an almost 
guaranteed way of reducing a very specific amount of pollution’ (John). Carbon tax 
supporters wanted similar guarantees. Dedicated use of raised revenue proved to be a 
key criterion reiterated within all groups.  
The sceptical individuals did not oppose spending more money on the 
development of low-emission technologies. They too requested strict dedication: ‘can 
we be sure that all of those levies do go towards this research and development and 
assistance in construction of wind farms or whatever it might be. Not disappear back 
into consolidated revenue’ (Mike). 
An ETS was seen to provide more certainty on emissions mitigation whereas a 
carbon tax seemingly offered greater transparency over the use of the raised revenue. 
Central to both ‘camps’ were the questions; ‘where is the money going?’ and ‘what is 
going to be achieved with it?’. When the discussion moved from intended financial 
support to low-emission technologies (Session 3), advocates of ETS and carbon tax 
articulated transparency and accountability concerns. For example, Ian, who shifted in 
preference from ETS to carbon tax, became aligned with his carbon tax counterparts’ 
arguments: 
 
Ian: So we'd have to have goals. So what we're going to do in - this is what 
you're going to pay and this is what you're going to get in 10 years' 
time. 
Cynthia: Yes, and they're measured on those targets. 
Ian: Yes, and every five years someone has to report to the parliament on 
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how close we are to achieving those goals. 
James: All the money is dedicated to establishing a low carbon economy.  
 
Kevin, a vocal speaker for ETS, also stressed that ‘it depends on how it's being used 
and how you can show me that it's really been of benefit to this country’. A group 
member, Dave, argued for carbon tax with the same concerns:  
 
If the government can get a solution that's very clearly outlined - where does the 
money go, how much it is, who will pay how much and who will not have to pay 
because they don't have the income - then this could really be a good thing. But if 
they don't explain it properly people will probably say no - as long as we don't 
know where the money goes to, then we're not part of it.  
 
Dave agreed with Mark, an ETS advocate, who suggested examples of inappropriate 
use of money by saying ‘There should be a bit of accountability and it should not be 
about propping up an existing industry sector like coal’.  
 A related factor frequently mentioned was trust. As emission mitigation does not 
have tangible benefits or visible consequences, assurance on proper use of funds and 
outcomes depends on the reliability and credibility of the collector and manager of 
these funds. In many instances participants appeared hesitant to endorse a particular 
policy option because of their lack of trust in businesses and in government 
bureaucrats. They suggested that carbon pricing could provide electricity companies 
with a legitimate reason to raise prices and doubted that the companies would 
genuinely and properly allocate the money to tackle climate change. Evidence 
included declining willingness to contribute under a hypothetical scenario, where the 
utilities could use the raised funds at their discretion, e.g. credited as consolidated 
revenue. More generally, the notion of emission trading was deemed to be an 
inappropriate transactional method. As Liana explained, with agreement from Dave, 
‘This trading scheme is too vulnerable to shonky dealing, shonky offsets, and weird 
sorts of trading loopholes’. This finding may be linked to prosecutory worldviews as 
described by Alexander et al (2011), where people are concerned that new policies do 
not avail system ‘cheats’ an avenue of benefit, and that new schemes implicated in 
natural resource management are fair and generally acceptable to established social 
behavioural norms. 
 Lack of trust also contributed to the unpopularity of voluntary offsetting: ‘when 
you tick the box when you buy an airline ticket, like carbon credits, that money is just 
banked somewhere it's not actually doing anything’ (Howard). The reliability of the 
market systems was called into doubt:  
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John: I’ve sort of generally always on principle, refused to buy them [carbon 
offsets].  I don’t know the system they’re going to. They always do 
research into what it’s going to but I really don’t know where that 
money is going to. 
Brian: It’s a lack of trust. 
John: Yeah, I just don’t trust the system. 
 
Mike had little disagreement on this point: ‘No. You can't trust business to actually 
take the place of government. There are certain things that government has a total 
responsibility for and one of them is the mechanism - a control of price’.  
 While everyone seriously considered issues of trust to be important, they differed 
in those to whom they attributed trust. Although carbon tax supporters tended to be 
suspicious of the markets, some failed to be reassured by the government: ‘I don't 
trust the government  - I don't want it to go into a general fund and they feel like they 
can spend it on carbon capture, which I don't believe in’ (Dave). Kevin trusted the 
market and this factor contributed to his argument for an ETS: ‘My approach would 
be ETS basically because I believe that the market will come up with more creative 
ideas and I believe it’s the most efficient way of going about it’. Likewise, Brian chose 
the markets in favor of the bureaucrats: ‘we can have a trading scheme and I’m 
against a carbon tax simply because [of] the bureaucrat’. 
 The importance of trust was twofold. Firstly it significantly influenced the policy 
choice of the groups. Secondly, the three groups, i.e. advocates of ETS and carbon tax 
and the sceptical individuals somehow merged into two groups. As Dave observed: ‘I 
think of all these things we're discussing today, the matter of trust seems really 
important. We all do not really seem to trust governments. Some of us don't trust the 
markets’. Concerns over trust made the discursive boundaries more permeable. Mike, 
initially showing a sceptical attitude, leant more toward tax supporters jointly arguing 
against the market believers: 
 
Mike: A form of carbon tax, I think. 
Kevin:  I disagree; you can say what’s the ETS because I believe in a market. 
Helen: You could split them into four. 
Sarah: I was just thinking about that, I thought we could actually divide this 
up a bit because that’s okay. 
Mike: I don’t trust the markets. 
Kevin: Well, I do.  
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Discussions surrounding certainty and accountability issues indicated greater shared 
agreement than was shown in trust discussions. Consensus occurred over the 
legitimacy of the principles of reliability and certainty/accountability. These principles 
facilitated the ensuing agreement to pay for emission mitigation. A causal relationship 
was evidenced: ‘The more transparent it is, the more I'd be willing to pay. You've got 
to damn well make it transparent, not just pull my leg’ (Kevin). This was also 
articulated in terms of guarantee of end use: ‘that the amount of money depends on 
what it's being used for’ (Elaine). 
Participants under disagreement identified subjective connections through these 
terms of acceptance, although the underlying principles were sometimes subject to 
different interpretations. For example, reliability of institutions was considered by all 
to be important. Yet while Dave did not trust the government, Mike appeared more 
confident and Kevin was optimistic about private markets but his group members 
seemed unconvinced. The divided perspectives came to overlap at an abstract level 
where mutual recognition and agreement were more likely to develop. This raised 
prospect for consensus, as Kevin concluded: ‘I’m against it but I would say that the 
carbon tax would be the preferred option of us all’. 
 
Communicative Role of Shared Frame of Reference 
Public scepticism or resistance to active climate protection has been seen to flourish 
in the larger society (Climate Institute 2010; Fleming and Vanclay 2009). 
Communicative and behavioural hurdles have to be avoided or removed to enable 
fruitful deliberation between sceptical and non-sceptical groups. As the case study has 
shown, sceptical positions softened when adherents joined the rest of the group in 
launching an attack on businesses. Capacity for discursive alignment can be built 
upon shared social experiences or rhetoric (Dryzek 2010b; O'Neill 2007). 
The perceived dichotomy of two ‘camps’ observed from the outset of discussions 
indicated the existence of established yet competing perspectives. Frustration 
expressed in the discussions was an active rebuttal of the existing political processes. 
These dispositions, which could have threatened the collaboration by strengthening a 
sense of indifference and encouraging withdrawal from the search for an agreed group 
preference, were not reinforced over the course of deliberation. Shared general 
principles, concerning the legitimacy of policy mechanisms, were discerned through a 
joint process of uncovering problems associated with the policy community. 
Communication along these lines allowed for an alignment of differing individual 
perspectives. A few participants eventually shifted to the majority position, whilst 
others came to respect contrasting opinions. Cooperative capacity was enhanced, 
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which may have contributed to the increasing support for the carbon tax option and 
improved willingness to pay on the part of the sceptical individuals. 
There are a number of possible reasons why the sceptics could have modified 
their stance. The change in opinion of the sceptics may have been because the process 
treated the sceptical participants with respect and gave them the opportunity to 
express their views in a non-threatening forum where they could learn from others.  
The presentations by experts may have increased the knowledge of the sceptics, 
presenting important information that was previously unknown. It is also possible that 
being in the minority group in a non-threatening forum could have resulted in social 
pressure to conform to the majority opinion. 
 Successful participatory dialogue can identify and take citizens to discursive 
spaces in which competing options, values or discourses can be communicated 
effectively (Dryzek 2000, 2010b). Instead of pitting themselves against each other in 
conflict or generalising about alternatives aiming for universal acceptance, a public 
deliberation should be designed to explore bridging elements that impress the 
divergent groups (Dryzek 2000, 2010b). Trust in institutions, for example, played 
such a role. The argument that implementation of a carbon tax would rest on trusted 
and familiar administrative mechanisms appealed to stated opponents of carbon tax as 
it matched their priority of trust concerns. As the legitimacy of these concerns was 
mutually recognised, they allowed reasons for endorsing the tax option to be couched 
in terms that its opponents found acceptable. This acceptance received their reflective 
assent built upon the knowledge that their key concerns had been recognised and 
addressed. It was at least partially derived from the deliberative virtue of reciprocity.  
Appeal to shared political experience (with the government and energy 
companies) made different arguments more accessible. It was instrumental to the 
making and listening of alternative representation claims and demonstrated a similar 
communicative role as effective as shared community memories (Burgess et al. 1988) 
and shared national identity (Hartz-Karp et al. 2010). Citizens’ attempt to build up 
cultural connections with trusted experts, as observed by Davies and Burgess (2004), 
contributed to effective production of collective decisions. Agreement across parties 
to a dispute may be facilitated in a deliberative arena by demonstrating the ways in 
which individuals are similarly situated in morally or politically relevant respects 
(Guttman and Thompson, 1996). Reciprocity entails an attempt to strengthen relations 
of knowledge or experience in search of apprehensible terms of reference that allow 
generalisation of divergent dispositions. Our study adds to the literature by affirming 
the communicative role of politically resonant experience and expectations. It lends 
empirical support to the call for invocation of shared cultural experiences and the use 
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of culturally resonant symbols to improve climate change communication (Moser and 
Dilling, 2007).  
Convergence in values is not a necessary condition of discursive alignment. 
Mutual respect is compatible with enduring communicated differences in normative 
dispositions. Our study does not offer clear evidence on the emancipatory effect of 
deliberation, which involved ‘correcting the distortion of public will’ (Niemeyer, 
2011, p. 128). According to Niemeyer (2011), when symbolic distortions are at work, 
deliberation citizens’ expressed preferences tend not to properly reflect the ends that 
they would have liked to achieve and this means a lack of ‘intersubjective 
consistency’. However, quantitative data collected from our deliberative forum 
statistically indicated the opposite trend of diminishing intersubjective consistency 
(Lo, 2011b). Seemingly this suggests a ‘distortion’ of public will, which nevertheless 
came with a commendable gain in mutual understanding. Identifying generalisable 
interests appears to be a different objective from correcting preferences. Further 
empirical research is needed to examine the discursive and epistemic arguments for 
public deliberation.   
 
  
Conclusion 
Twenty four Australian citizens gathered to discuss issues about carbon pricing. They 
differed about the need and means for carbon pricing. Common grounds were then 
discerned through articulating shared policy considerations including trustfulness and 
accountability. Establishing a reliable, trusted institution for handling the financial 
matters involved proved to be a priority shared among participants. These shared 
political expectations fostered reciprocal communication and cooperation by holding 
diverse individuals within a narrative or storyline. The deliberation resulted in a 
majority support to the notion of a carbon tax. Those remaining unconvinced 
expressed respect for the group preference and the sceptical individuals indicated an 
increasing level of willingness to pay for mitigation. This provided impetus for more 
substantial agreements that would be required when formalising binding decisions 
from policy deliberations. 
The research has shown what kind of communication public deliberation ought 
to achieve to produce consensual outcomes. Citizens who compete to advise on what 
course of action is needed may engage in a policy dialogue more effectively on the 
basis of more general, shared expectations about political life. Appeals to similar 
political, social or geographical experiences could make conflict more tractable and 
dialogue more fruitful. Competing options couched in discursive terms compatible 
with each other may then appear more accessible to their opponents. Deliberative 
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inquiry about issues of national importance, such as climate change, would benefit 
from a greater understanding of what constitutes the discursive channels for 
communication between differently situated actors. The democratic quality of public 
deliberation should be assessed in terms of the capacity for participants to reflect, 
modify or generalise their beliefs in recognition of the deliberative virtues of respect 
and reciprocity.  
Public deliberative forums may be a better site for deliberating public policy than 
formal political institutions in terms of the potential for mutual recognition among 
deliberators. Democratic legitimacy can be achieved by participation in authentic 
deliberation on the part of those subject to a collective decision, in contrast to the 
traditional definitions couched in electoral and constitutional terms. Formal 
policy-making processes that reward adversarial politics do not accommodate the 
virtue of reciprocity, which is increasingly seen as a function of democratic 
legitimacy in plural societies. From this perspective, citizen forums as a form of 
mini-public may produce decisions that are more responsive to the different priorities 
of people and more democratic than partisan politics dominated by elites.  
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Table 1 Stated preference of respondents 
 Pre-deliberation Post-deliberation 
Respondent Primary preference WTP Primary preference WTP 
Alan Tax + Tax + 
Brian Tax + Tax + 
Claire Tax + Tax + 
Cynthia Tax + Tax + 
Dan Voluntary offsetting + Tax and ETS + 
Dave Tax + Tax + 
Elaine ETS + ETS + 
George ETS Not specified ETS + 
Helen ETS + Tax + 
Howard ETS + Tax + 
Ian ETS + Tax + 
James Tax + Tax + 
John ETS + ETS + 
Kate Tax + Tax + 
Kevin ETS + ETS + 
Liana Tax + Tax + 
Mark ETS + ETS + 
Mike No pricing Refused Tax + 
Nancy No pricing Refused No pricing + 
Phillip Tax + Tax + 
Ross Tax + Tax + 
Sarah Tax + Tax + 
Stephanie Tax + ETS + 
Wilson ETS + ETS + 
Notes: Tax: carbon tax; ETS: emission trading scheme; No pricing: No carbon 
pricing on human activities; ‘+’ : positive willingness-to-pay 
 
 
